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CONSTRUCTION OF A WILL AND THE THRESHOLD
QUESTION OF STATE ACTION
First National Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1975)
Testator's will created a charitable trust," limiting the beneficiaries to
"Protestant Christian Hospitals" and white patients.2 The trustee
1. A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property aris-
ing as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting
the person by whom the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the
property for a charitable purpose.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 348 (1957). In Missouri, chapter 456, Mo. REv.
STAT. (1969) regulates the creation and administration of trusts. The difference be-
tween a charitable trust and a private trust is the character of the beneficiaries. A pri-
vate trust dedicates property to the benefit of specified persons; a charitable trust in-
volves property dedicated to the benefit of the community. A private trust must desig-
nate a beneficiary ascertainable at the creation of the trust or within the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities. A charitable trust is free from such limitations. See 4 A.
Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS §§ 348, 369 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT];
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 369 (1957).
A charitable trust requires a charitable purpose. Numerous purposes have been
adjudged charitable, see SCorT § 368; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRusTs § 368
(1957), although an exhaustive list is impossible due to the varying needs of separate
communities. Courts often quote Lord Macnaghten's definition of charity:
'Charity' in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the re-
lief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advance-
ment of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community,
not failing under any of the preceding heads.
Scorr § 368, quoting Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v. Pemsel,
[18911 A.C. 531, 583. See generally ScoTr §§ 348-403; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS §§ 348-403 (1957); Power, The Racially Discriminatory Charitable Trust. A
Suggested Treatment, 9 ST. Louis L.J. 478 (1965); Stinson, Modern Charitable Trusts
and the Law, 17 ST. Louis L. REv. 307 (1932); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 736 (1969).
2. The will required that the trust funds, valued at $11,392,703.00 on January 17,
1974. be used
in contributing to the maintenance and support of Protestant Christian Hos-
pitals operated and maintained upon a nonprofit basis in the territory now con-
stituting Jackson County, Missouri, and not elsewhere, and/or in contributing
to the maintenance, support and care of sick and infirm patients in said Hos-
pitals, born of white parents in the United States of America ...
And I give my said Trustees. . . sole power and authority to select. . . such
Hospital and Hospitals of the kind and character aforesaid as in the judgment
and discretion of Trustees . . . as they . . . shall determine to be giving and
will continue to give the greatest measure of hospital service and care to de-
serving poor and unfortunate people of the class aforesaid.
Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 3-4, First Natl Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808
(Mo.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). The trial court ruled that the 'words "and/
or" were used in the conjunctive sense. Id. at 5. Thus, the trustee could not assert
1111
Washington University Open Scholarship
1112 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:1111
brought an action for construction of the will.' The Attorney General
of Missouri4 asserted that the creation and administration of the trust,
and judicial construction of the will involved state statutes and courts;
hence the racially discriminatory terms of the trust violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Of twenty-three hos-
an option to present funds to the hospitals only, thereby circumventing the racial dis-
crimination inherent in granting funds to white patients only.
3. Mo. REv. STAT. § 527.040 (1969) provides:
Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or
cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent,
an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal rela-
tions in respect thereto:
(1) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs, next of kin
or others; or
(2) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or abstain from
doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(3) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate
or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings.
In First National Bank, the trustee sought construction of the phrase "Protestant Chris-
tian Hospitals," and identification of the individual beneficiaries, 523 S.W.2d at 812.
The trial court held that the phrase meant those hospitals with "some special relationship
to and at least partial control by a Protestant Christian church." id. at 815.
4. The Attorney General represents the community's interest in the enforcement
of a charitable trust. See generally ScoTr § 391; Note, The Attorney General and the
Charitable Trust Act-Wills, Contest and Construction, 14 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 194
(1965); Note, The Enforcement of Charitable Trusts, 18 SYRACUSE L. REv. 618 (1967).
5. The Attorney General asked that the court apply either of two doctrines to per-
mit the distribution of trust funds on a constitutionally valid basis. 523 S.W.2d at 816.
The more conservative doctrine, "deviation," enables trustees to deviate from the ex-
press terms, but not the stated purpose, of a trust when literal compliance would be im-
possible or illegal. Deviation therefore alters only the methods of accomplishing the pur-
poses of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 381 (1957). Missouri has
adopted the doctrine. See Reed v. Eagleton, 384 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1964) (city's pur-
chase of additional recreational facilities as stipulated by charitable trust was impracti-
cal; court authorized application of trust funds to maintain existing facilities); Lackland
v. Walker, 151 Mo. 210, 52 S.W. 414 (1899) (when land rents proved insufficient to
fund charitable trust, sale of these lands was proper to derive income to maintain trust).
While deviation applies to both private and charitable trusts, the second doctrine, "cy
pres," is unique to charitable trusts. Cy pres permits alteration of the specific purpose
expressed in the trust instrument, if the testators original purpose is impossible to ful-
fill. When a general charitable intention is evident, courts assume that the creator of
the trust would have applied the trust property to other, similar charitable purposes
rather than permit the trust to fail. See ScoiT § 399; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TRUSTS § 399 (1957).
The radical step of applying cy pres is consistent with the liberal rules of construction
governing charitable trusts, which are favorites of the law and are to be construed as
valid whenever possible. Burrier v. Jones, 338 Mo. 679, 92 S.W.2d 885 (1936); Mott
v. Morris, 249 Mo. 135, 155 S.W. 434 (1913); see Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 439-
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pitals joined as codefendants, four sought to uphold the trust's validity,6
and thirteen maintained that the discriminatory provisions were illegal. 7
The trial court upheld the restrictions.' The Supreme Court of Mis-
souri affirmed and held: Neither the creation and administration of a
charitable trust, nor judicial construction of the will that created the
trust, constitutes state action under the fourteenth amendment.'
43 (1970). For a summary of the historical development of the doctrine, see Church
of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 50-60 (1890).
See also E. FISCH, Tim CY PREs DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950); ScoTr §§
399-399.4; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 399 (1957); Fisch, Changing Concepts
and Cy Pres, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 382 (1959); Peters, A Decade of Cy Pres: 1955-65,
39 TEMP. L.Q. 256 (1966); Report of Committee on Charitable Trusts, 104 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 990 (1965).
6. These hospitals contended that the racial limitation in the trust was purely pri-
vate discrimination, involving no state instrumentality. They argued that neither the
trust, the trustee, the hospitals, nor the trial court had fostered religious discrimination.
They also asserted that the trial court had not engaged in religious doctrinal disputes
by determining the proper recipient hospitals, and had not violated the first or fourteenth
amendments. Brief for Defendants-Respondents at 21, 24, 25, First Nat'l Bank v. Dan-
forth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). These hospitals were
those that the trial court had determined to be "Protestant Christian Hospitals" and
therefore eligible for an award of trust funds. Id. at 9-10.
7. Eight of these hospitals, known as the Lakeside Group, pursued the appeal,
joined by appellant Martin Luther King, Jr. Memorial Hospital. Of the remaining hos-
pitals in Jackson County, two were disqualified as government operated, one was disqual-
ified as a profit-making corporation, two disclaimed any right to benefits, and one hos-
pital did not file an answer. Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent at 19-21, First Nat'l Bank
v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
The Lakeside Group asserted that the trial court's enforcement of the trust's restric-
tions constituted state action. The group claimed additional grounds for state action de-
riving from the nature of the trust, the hospital beneficiaries, and the trustee-bank. Ap-
pellants further contended that the trial court had violated the first and fourteenth
amendments by interfering in a matter of religious doctrine. The Lakeside Group
sought to apply deviation or cy pres to save the trust from failure. Brief for Defend-
ants-Appellants at 16-19, First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). For a discussion of cy pres, see note 5 supra.
Other parties to the suit were four allegedly collateral heirs and the unknown heirs.
Both known and unknown heirs argued that the trust violated the fourteenth amend-
ment and was thus illegal, that the trust instrument did not manifest a general charitable
intention so that cy pres was inapplicable, and, therefore, the trust res should revert to
them. First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 815-16 (Mo.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1016 (1975).
8. First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, No. 726,091 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Oct. 10, 1973).
9. First Nat'l Bank v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 821-22 (Mo.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1016 (1975). The court also rejected appellant's claim that the term "Protestant
Christian" was so vague as applied to hospitals that its meaning could not be deter-
mined:
"Protestant Christian" is not ambiguous. Both terms have an ascertain-
able meaning; and in common and familiar usage denote a non-Catholic Chris-
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The fourteenth amendment, 10 passed in 1868, was intended to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of the recently liberated blacks from en-
croachment by the states." Thus, approval of or participation in
unconstitutional conduct by some part of the state govemment' 2 is a
prerequisite to constitutional invalidity under the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 3
tian religious body. When the non-Catholic Protestant Christian entity is a
hospital . . . it reasonably means . . . a hospital that has some relationship
to and control by a Protestant Christian Church, and when such bodies are
selected in the trustee's discretion, such class becomes fixed and definite.
523 S.W.2d at 818.
10. The fourteenth amendment, which became part of the Constitution on July 21,
1868, declares:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) [here-
inafter cited as FLAcK]; J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1951); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Bickel]; Frank & Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Frank & Munro]; Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 WIs. L. REv. 479, 610.
The 39th Congress did not foresee the impact of section one of the amendment on
future generations. See, e.g., FLACK 94 (fourteenth amendment reflected congressional
desire to make the Bill of Rights binding on states and to give validity to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981-82 (1970)); Bickel 58 (lack of congressional interest in
section one due to consensus that the section merely embodied the Civil Rights Act of
1866); Frank & Munro 140-41 (congressional attention concentrated on political sections
of the fourteenth amendment while virtually ignoring section one). See note 44 infra.
12. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20
(1948); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90 (1908); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 11 (1883); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 347 (1880).
13. The earliest cases involving the fourteenth amendment made clear that the
amendment could not be used to eliminate all discrimination. In United States v. Cruik-
shank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), white men were convicted of violating a federal law by dis.
rupting a political meeting of blacks. The Supreme Court overturned their convictions,
implying that the law was unconstitutional. This decision was the first formulation of
the principle that the fourteenth amendment only prohibits discriminatory activities by
the states. Two later cases, both involving the constitutionality of all white juries, af-
firmed the requirement of state interference with constitutional rights. Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). Finally the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), declared unconstitutional an attempt by Congress to
outlaw discrimination absent state action. "It is state action of a particular characterhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/8
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Courts have applied the fourteenth amendment in the absence of
obvious state involvement when confronted with racial discrimination. 4
In Shelley v. Kraemer'5 the Supreme Court held that a state court
that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
Amendment." Id. at 11. The effect of this decision was twofold: the fourteenth
amendment provides no remedy against private discrimination, and any constitutionally
appropriate remedy for private discrimination must be provided by the state. For dis-
cussion of state action, see Burke & Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Cred-
itors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L REv. 1003
(1973); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083 (1960); Note,
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974). See note 44 infra.
14. Courts often look beneath the surface of an allegedly discriminatory deed to find
state action in its ramifications. Even in the absence of a discriminatory state statute,
the Supreme Court held that police enforcement of a state custom authorizing restau-
rants to refuse to serve whites accompanied by blacks constituted state action. Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967),
the Court found unconstitutional state action in an addition to the California Constitu-
tion that prohibited the state from interfering with a private individual's sale or refusal
to sell residential property. Where a restaurant leased space in a parking garage owned
and operated by the state, the Supreme Court held that the refusal to serve a black con-
stituted state action because the state was a participant in the discrimination. Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See note 20 infra. In Jackson
v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975),
and McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), the grant of tax benefits
and a scheme of government regulation provided a basis for finding state action in the
conduct of private foundations and fraternal orders.
The Fourth Circuit has held that hospitals performing the public function of health
care or receiving Hill-Burton funds, see note 43 infra, are subject to fourteenth amend-
ment strictures. See Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th
Cir. 1966); Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963). See also Coleman v. Wagner College, 429
F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (state aid to private school rendered schools' racially discrim-
inatory conduct unconstitutional). For cases involving sex discrimination, see Rackin
v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Seidenberg v. McSor-
ley's Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (state issuance of liquor
license renders tavern's sex discrimination actionable).
Recent cases indicate that the Supreme Court is presently unwilling to enlarge the
scope of state action. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
In Moose Lodge, a black male claimed that appellant's refusal to serve him violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument that issuance of a private club liquor license by the Pennsylvania liquor board
was state action since the licensing did not "foster or encourage racial discrimination,"
and because the state was not a "joint venturer in the club's enterprise." Id. at 176-
77. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (discussed in
note 44 infra); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S .551 (1972) (discussed in note 19
Infra).
15. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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may not enforce a private, racially restrictive covenant.10 In Bar-
rows v. Jackson17 the Court held that the fourteenth amendment
prohibited the exercise of state judicial power to award damages for the
breach of a racially restrictive covenant.' 8  The Court further enlarged
the state action concept in ruling that the assumption of a "public
function" by a private corporation rendered otherwise private dis-
criminatory conduct unconstitutional.' 9 Still another line of cases
16. Id. In 1911, thirty property owners in a St. Louis neighborhood agreed not to
sell their properties to non-Caucasians. Thirty-four years later, a tract encompassed by
the agreement was sold to appellant, a black. Respondent, owner of a parcel subject
to the terms of the restrictive agreement, brought a suit in equity to enjoin petitioner
from taking possession and to revest title in the grantor. The trial court questioned the
validity of the original agreement and refused to issue an injunction. The Supreme
Court of Missouri reversed and granted respondent's plea. Kraemer v. Shelley, 355 Mo.
814, 198 S.W.2d 679 (1946), rev'd, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In reversing the Missouri Su-
preme Court, the United States Supreme Court conceded that a racially restrictive cove-
nant was not unconstitutional if the covenantors adhered to it voluntarily. But a cove-
nantor could not seek redress for a violation in the state courts. 334 U.S. at 13. State
courts are instrumentalities of the state and discriminatory actions forbidden to the state
may not be implemented by state courts. Id. at 18, 20.
17. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
18. Petitioner attempted to accomplish at law what Shelley v. Kraemer had pro-
scribed in equity-effectuation of a racially restrictive covenant. Petitioner was party
to a covenant restricting the sale of property to non-Caucasians. Respondent, a co-cov-
enantor, breached the covenant by conveying land to a black, leading petitioner to seek
monetary damages. 346 U.S. at 251. The Supreme Court characterized the exercise
of judicial power to make such an award as state action in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. To permit damages, the Court reasoned, would be to sanction the racially
restrictive covenant. Id. at 254. If the state, through its courts, were to require pay-
ment of damages, the potential seller would face the choice of not selling to a black,
or of adding a surcharge to cover his future damages. Either outcome would discourage
sales to the excluded minority and deny them equal protection of the laws. Id.
Other cases have invalidated discriminatory covenants. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296 (1966); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392
F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
v. Buchanan, 346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C.), afrd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Sweet
Briar Institute v. Button, 280 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1967); Milford Trust Co. v.
Stabler, 301 A.2d 534 (Del. Ch. 1973); Bank of Delaware v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710
(Del. Ch. 1969); Howard Say. Institution v. Peep, 34 N.J. 494, 170 A.2d 39 (1961);
In re Hawley's Estate, 32 Misc. 2d 624, 223 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sur. Ct. 1961).
19. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the Supreme Court held
that a private corporation had assumed a public function by creating a company-owned
town "operated primarily to benefit the public." Id. at 506. Thus, the town's refusal
to allow the distribution of religious literature in a community "business block" was state
action in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court subsequently re-
lied upon Marsh to hold that a privately owned shopping center was a "community busi-
ness block" and that infringement upon the exercise of first amendment rights through
the use of trespass laws constituted state action. Amalgamated Food Employees Union
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss4/8
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indicated that state approval through regulatory or licensing agencies
may constitute state action.20  The disparate circumstances in which
v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-
02 (1966), where the Court prohibited a privately owned park that was municipal in
nature from being maintained on a discriminatory basis since it performed a public func-
tion. See also note 28 infra.
Recent cases indicate that the public function analysis established in Marsh will be
limited to its facts. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Although the
Supreme Court in Lloyd conceded that a shopping center was the functional equivalent
of a public business district, it permitted the owner to prohibit picketing because the pro-
test was unrelated to the shopping center's purpose and there were "adequate alternative
avenues of communication." Id. at 564, 566. The Court characterized Marsh as "an
economic anomaly of the past, 'the company town,"' id. at 561, and implied that the
Marsh reasoning was inapplicable where the entity in question had not assumed all the
attributes of a state-created municipality. Id. at 569. Marsh was further undermined
in Hudgens v. NLRB, 44 U.S.L.W. 4281 (U.S., Mar. 3, 1976), where the Supreme
Court declared "that the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Lloyd cannot be squared
with the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Logan Valley. . . . MIhe rationale of
Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case." Id. at 4285.
The Supreme Court has employed reasoning similar to the public function rationale
in handling cases involving the fifteenth amendment's prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion by federal or state government in national and state elections. See Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953) (political "club" that conducted part of the state elective process
may not exclude blacks); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (political party's
rules excluding blacks from voting in party's primaries violate fifteenth amendment);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (political committee empowered to hold state pri-
maries forbidden to discriminate).
20. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); cf. Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). In Burton, the Court held that state action
included even tacit approval of racial discrimination by a state authority which had
leased space in a publicly owned building to a restaurant that refused to serve blacks.
There was mutual benefit to the state and restaurant, which implicated the former in
the discriminatory practices of the latter. 365 U.S. at 723-24. See note 45 infra.
As Burton noted, however, no test has been formulated for the presence of state ac-
tion. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involve-
ment of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722. The
unpredictability of the "sifting facts" procedure was evidenced in Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Petitioner, a black, was denied service on racial grounds
by a private club that held a state liquor license. Absent the "symbiotic relationship"
in Burton, the Court failed to find a "sufficiently close nexus" between the state and
the challenged activity. Id. at 176. The Court suggested that state action would be
present if state regulation fostered racial discrimination, or if the state were a joint ven-
turer in the undertaking. Id.
The Court most recently reviewed the effect of licensing and regulation in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), characterized by the First National
Bank court as "[t]he last word" on the subject. 523 S.W.2d at 822. Jackson dealt with
the process due customers cut off from electric service by a utility that had received a
certificate of public convenience from the state utility commission. Applying the Bur-
son test of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances," the Court examined the utility's
near monopoly status, the state's extensive regulation of the utility, the nature of the
service performed, the utility's filing of a tariff with the state commission, and the ab-
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courts have found state action,21 however, has left the limits of the
concept unclear.22
In First National Bank v. Danforth,28 the Missouri Supreme Court
found none of these cases apposite,24 and rejected three possible sources
of state involvement .2  First, the court implicitly rejected the argument
sence of a symbiotic relationship with the state. Because discriminatory conduct must
be "attributable" to the state, the Court found insufficient state involvement to invoke
the fourteenth amendment. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra at 356; note 44
infra.
21. See cases cited notes 14-20 supra.
22. One court has described the concept as the "murky waters of state action." Mc-
Glotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 449 (D.D.C. 1972).
23. 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
24. 523 S.W.2d at 820-21.
25. The court initially assumed that the trust would create racial discrimination by
selecting only white patients as one class of beneficiaries. 523 S.W.2d at 820. It quali-
fied the concession, however, by noting that the beneficiary hospitals could use the trust
funds as they wished, including application to health care services that were offered on
a non-discriminatory basis. Id. at 821. The court thought this lessened the involvement
of the state in the discrimination. Id.
The court's reasoning here is perplexing. Since the trustee must allocate income on an
annual basis to those hospitals that provide the greatest measure of service to white per-
sons, the trust encourages racially discriminatory hospitals. To ignore the effect of this
quasi-competitive standard for choosing hospitals is to ignore the rationale behind Bar-
rows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Barrows invalidated a claim for damages for
breach of a racially restrictive covenant on the theory that future sellers would be dis-
couraged from selling to blacks. See note 18 supra. The First National Bank holding
will encourage discrimination because it endorsed the award of funds to those hospitals
best serving whites.
Although Barrows and Shelley involved inter vivos agreements whereas the discrimina-
tion in First National Bank resulted from a gratuitous transfer by will, the Missouri
Supreme Court refused to distinguish the cases on these grounds. See also Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
On the related issue of religious discrimination, the court held that secular institutions
such as hospitals may be operated by religious organizations without losing their secular
status. 523 S.W.2d at 820, citing Speer v. Colbert, 200 U.S. 130 (1906); Bradfield v.
Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899); Wyatt v. Stillman Institute, 303 Mo. 94, 260 S.W. 73
(1923); Society of Helpers v. Law, 267 Mo. 667, 186 S.W. 718 (1916); State ex tel.
Morris v. Board of Trustees, 175 Mo. 52, 74 S.W. 990 (1903). Although the court ap-
parently used these cases to rebut the claim of racial discrimination, later language sug-
gests that the court actually intended to dispose of the religious discrimination issue.
See 523 S.W.2d at 820.
Because it found the trust valid, the court did not discuss the application of deviation
or cy pres. See note 5 supra. For examples of courts that did apply cy pres to strike
racial restrictions from charitable trusts, see Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Buchanan,
346 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C.), affd, 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bank of Delaware
v. Buckson, 255 A.2d 710 (Del. Ch. 1969); Trammell v. Elliott, 230 Ga. 841, 199 S.E.2d
194 (1973); Wooten v. Fitz-Gerald, 440 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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that the right to make a will and create a trust was a source of state ac-
tion, absent a governmental body as trustee. 6 Thus, the court distin-
guished Evans v. Newton,2 7 which had also examined the constitution-
ality of a racially restrictive charitable trust created by will.28 In Evans
a governmental body had served as trustee; but in First National Bank,
the testator, the trust res, the trustee, and the beneficiaries were all pri-
vate.29  The court next rejected the claim that judicial construction of
the will created the requisite state action.30 Shelley and Barrows, the
court reasoned, involved affirmative judicial action to enforce racial dis-
crimination; whereas the First National Bank court merely interpreted
the intent of the testator.31 A contrary rule would invalidate all ra-
cially or religiously discriminatory wills that require judicial construc-
tion, a result the First National Bank court thought contrary to prece-
dent.32 Finally, the court summarily rejected the claim that the public
character of a charitable trust,33 or the quasi-public character of the
trustee bank,34 necessarily implicated the state in racial discrimination.
The court's reasoning is unpersuasive. In Evans, private citizens had
replaced the city as trustee by the time of the Supreme Court ruling.35
26. 523 S.W.2d at 821.
27. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
28. Evans involved a trust created by the will of Senator Bacon, which established
a park in the city of Macon, Georgia, for enjoyment of white citizens only. The city
was appointed trustee but subsequently resigned when it felt it could no longer adminis-
ter the park on a segregated basis. To replace the city a state court appointed private
trustees who continued to maintain the park for whites only. The Supreme Court ac-
cepted the state court's appointment of trustees but ruled that the park could not be seg-
regated. The Court presumed continued municipal maintenance of the park and "but-
tressed" this presumption by noting that the facilities offered by a park, even a private
park, were "municipal in nature." Id. at 301.
29. 523 S.W.2d at 821.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. But see notes 38-41, 46 infra and accompanying text.
33. 523 S.W.2d at 822.
34. Id.
35. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966). The First National Bank court
used a frequently quoted passage from Evans to support its conclusion that no state ac-
tion was present. "If a testator wanted to leave a school or center for the use of one
race only and in no way implicated the State. . .arguendo. . . no constitutional diffi-
culty would be encountered." 523 S.W.2d at 821, quoting Evans v. Newton, supra at
300. This excerpt from Evans, however, simply states the question. Evans reserved
decision on the precise issue before the First National Bank court, whether the state fa-
cilitated racial discrimination through its statutory provisions for charitable trusts. See
Evans v. Newton, supra at 300-01 n.3.
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Although the Court based its decision in part upon the "momentum
[the park] acquired as a public facility," it clearly held that the "public
character" of the park prohibited its segregated operation by any trustee,
public or private. 36  Thus, state courts, by assisting private parties in the
performance of a public function, implicate the state in that action.87
The First National Bank court's treatment of Shelley and Barrows is still
less persuasive. The distinction between "affirmative judicial ac-
tion" enjoining possession, divesting title or awarding damages, and
passive construction of a testator's intent cannot withstand analysis.88
36. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966).
37. Id. at 302. See also notes 42-45 infra and accompanying text. After the Su-
preme Court had ruled in Evans v. Newton that the park could not be maintained on
a discriminatory basis, the Georgia trial court determined that Bacon's will had not
manifested a general charitable intent because his sole purpose was to create a segregated
park. Accordingly, the court refused to apply cy pres, see note 5 supra, and held that
the trust had failed. The trust property reverted to the testator's heirs at law. After
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, the United States Supreme
Court held in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), that the state courts' refusal to
save the trust through cy pres did not violate the fourteenth amendment because those
courts had merely applied neutral rules of construction to arrive at a decision which did
not produce a violation of any constitutionally protected rights. The Court rejected the
argument based on Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), see note 16 supra, that the
trial court's action was unconstitutional on grounds that it encouraged a private scheme
of discrimination. The elimination of the park was also the end of any discrimination.
Similarly, since blacks and whites were equally deprived of enjoyment of the park, the
Court rejected petitioners' equal protection argument. 396 U.S. at 445.
Although First National Bank v. Danforth and Evans v. Abney both involved judicial
construction of a testator's will there are crucial differences between the two cases. In
Evans v. Abney, the Supreme Court was considering a trust that had already been ad-
judged unconstitutional and thus unenforceable. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966); note 28 supra. The primary issue was whether the testator had the general
charitable intent necessary to apply cy pres. The state court's refusal to apply cy pres
was not in itself unconstitutional because no discrimination resulted. In First National
Bank v. Danforth, however, the constitutionality of the trust was at issue. The court
deemed it unnecessary to determine the existence of a general charitable intent since tho
conclusion that the trust was constitutional rendered the doctrine of cy pres inapplicable,
see note 5 supra. In contrast to Evans v. Abney, the decision in First National Bank
v. Danforth permitted the enforcement of a trust which by the court's own admission
was racially discriminatory.
38. Shelley is the touchstone against which cases involving judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants must be appraised. The Shelley record contains no refer-
ence to "affirmative judicial enforcement," though the Supreme Court repeatedly alluded
to "judicial action" and "judicial enforcement." 334 U.S. 1 at 8, 13-15, 20.
Because the Court in Shelley did not specifically describe any restrictions on judicial
enforcement as a source of state action, courts could extend the doctrine to any judicial
action or restrict it to a narrow interpretation. Commentators have noted this dilemma.
Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer-Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. RaV. 473
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Each judicial action is equally essential to implement the discrimina-
tion." Since Shelley held that "the action of state courts . . . is to be
(1962); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. PA.
L REv. 637 (1961); Comment, The Impact of Shelley v. Kraemer on the State Action
Concept, 44 CAL. L. REV. 718 (1956); 65 COLUM. L. REv. 919 (1965).
39. One might suggest that the construction in First National Bank was not essen-
tial to discrimination, since the trustee could have proceeded without it. As a practical
matter, however, trustees are unlikely to distribute significant funds from ambiguously
worded trusts. In any event, the decision to seek judicial construction should settle the
imue of state action.
The First National Bank suit was authorized by Mo. REv. STAT. § 527.040 (1969)
quoted in note 3 supra. The section is part of the Missouri enactment of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act, the scope of which is described in Mo. Rtv. STAT. § 527.010
(19m9):
The Circuit courts and courts of common pleas of this state, within their
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judg-
ment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and ef-
fect of a final judgment or decree.
Because § 527.010 is substantially the same as the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970), and the declaratory judgment enactments of other states,
the decisions of other courts interpreting the Act are persuasive authority. State ex rel.
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, 351 Mo. 1089, 176 S.W.2d 25 (1943).
Relief through declaratory judgment is sui generis, being neither legal nor equitable,
though it may be combined with a plea for legal or equitable relief. Wallace v. Nor-
man Indus., Inc., 467 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1972); Sanders v. Louisville & N.R.R., 144
F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1944); Mutual Drug Co. v. Sewall, 353 Mo. 375, 182 S.W.2d 575
(1944). Although a judgment normally requires some form of execution, lack of execu-
tion does not invalidate the judicial function. Nashville, C. & S.L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288
U.S. 249, 263 (1933).
In an effort to counteract the mistaken belief that a declaratory judgment is an ad-
visory opinion, courts stress the fact that the sine qua non of an action for a declaratory
judgment is a justiciable controversy. The case must not present an abstract or hypo-
thetical problem. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); United
Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288 (1936); Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 222 S.W.2d 70 (1949).
Furthermore, the controversy must be amenable to a conclusive decree. Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); State ex rel. Chilcutt v. Thatch, 359 Mo.
122, 221 S.W.2d 172 (1949). The court may not assert jurisdiction over the controversy
unless its decision will terminate the controversy and grant relief. Cha-Toine Hotel
Apartments Bldg. Corp. v. Shogren, 204 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1953); Panhandle E. Pipe
Line Co. v. Michigan Consol. Gas. Co., 177 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1949); Angell v.
Schram, 109 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1940). An opinion rendered in a suit for declaratory
judgment is res judicata. Daniels v. Thomas, 225 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956); Smith v. Pettis County, 345 Mo. 839, 136 S.W.2d 282
(1940). See generally, W. ANDERSON, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1951). In First Na-
donal Bank the trial court accepted a controversy for adjudication and rendered a final
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regarded as action of the State, ' 40 judicial construction of a racially
discriminatory will should suffice to invoke the fourteenth amend-
ment.41  Also puzzling was the conclusion that neither the bank,4 2 the
and binding judgment on the parties. The trustee could not legally disregard that judg-
ment. These factors combine to involve the state in a violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
40. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948). See notes 15-16 supra and accom-
panying text.
41. See, e.g., In re Potter, 275 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch. 1970). In Potter, the trustees
of a charitable trust limiting beneficiaries to poor whites refused to serve. The state
chancery court subsequently appointed trustees and continued to do so over the life of
the trust. When the trustee sought instructions regarding the application of a non-white
for aid from the racially discriminatory trust, the Delaware Court of Chancery con-
cluded that its own involvement in the supervision and direction of the trust constituted
state action. Id. at 583. The court reasoned that only if judicial supervision were of
a "routine nature" could a charitable trust be deemed "non-public" for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 582. Unfortunately, the court neglected to delineate the
scope of "judicial supervision of a routine nature." It merely declared that when, as
in Potter, state action had been established,
not only may this Court not seek to take a position of neutrality . . . but . . .
it must affirmatively instruct [the trustee to pay no regard] to the color of any
applicant's skin ....
Id. at 583. But see In re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 570, reh. denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958). In Girard, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court pointed out that if any action by a state court constituted sufficient state
action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, no private charity created by will
could make distributions according to race, creed, or color because all wills must first
be probated. Id. at 454. Since Girard upheld the substitution of private individuals for
a city as trustees of a racially discriminatory trust, it is doubtful that the decision would
be valid in the wake of Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See notes 28, 35, 37
supra. Finally, the racially restrictive terms under consideration in Girard were ulti-
mately stricken from the trust. See Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.
1968). See also Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will
of Stephen Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957); Power, supra note 1. Clark argued:
In Shelley v. Kraemer, no judicial action was necessary to bring the covenants
into existence or to make them effective if the parties chose to honor their
terms. But the charitable trust has no such original vitality. . . . The trust
becomes operative only after a court has found . . . that it is charitable .
To encourage a continuous flow of funds into philanthropic enterprises, [the
government] bestows privileges, of which tax immunity is only one. The state
creates and defines charitable trusts, grants them perpetual existence, modern-
izes them through cy pres, appoints and regulates the trustees, approves ac-
counts, construes ambiguous language in the trust charter and sometimes goes
so far as to impose a less stringent standard of tort liability on such trusts than
on their private counterparts.
Clark, supra at 1003-04.
42. The court noted that the privately owned bank selected beneficiaries in an "ex-
ercise of unlimited discretion." 523 S.W.2d at 821. Because the trustee was guided only
by the specifications of the testator, no public body was involved in the selection proce-
dure. Therefore, the court reasoned, the bank's affiliation with the trust could not be
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hospital, ' nor the charitable trust served a function sufficiently public
the source of state action. The court later added that the bank, a national organization,
was not engaged in "significant encouragement of discrimination as to constitute a 'state
action.'" Id. at 822, citing Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441,
113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974). The Kruger court outlined the extensive relations between
states and the banking industry but rejected the contention that bank action is state ac-
tion. The court speculated:
As concepts of state action evolve to correspond more closely to economic real-
ity, we may arrive at judicial recognition that such institutions and enterprises
should be considered agents of the state.
Id. at 365, 521 P.2d at 449, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 457. This argument is strengthened by
a line of cases declaring that national banks are the agencies and instrumentalities of
the federal government. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 41-43, First Nat'l Bank
v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808 (Mo.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975), citing First
Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 256 (1966); Franklin Nat'l Bank
v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375 (1954); First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341,
347 (1926); Christopher v. Norvell, 201 U.S. 216, 225 (1906). See also A. BEUE, THE
THREE FACES OF POWER 39-50 (1967) (corporate action denying "equal protection of
the laws" should be state action, because of state power to grant the corporate-form priv-
ileges).
Courts have adjudged the banking industry to be "affected with a public interest."
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911). Moreover, a bank's "transactions
frequently are subjected to closer scrutiny and tested by a higher standard than that ap-
plied to ordinary commercial affairs." Rothschild v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 279 N.Y.
355, 359, 18 N.E.2d 527, 528 (1939), citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra. But
the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the "affected with a public interest" test as
a basis for state action. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353-54
(1974).
43. Courts have disagreed whether the public function that hospitals and universi-
ties serve, and the government subsidies and tax benefits received by these institutions,
sufficiently implicate the state to prohibit discriminatory action. The majority of cases
alleging unconstitutional discrimination by a hospital or university are brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
The statute's "under color of" law provision is identical to the fourteenth amendment's
state action requirement. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966);
Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873, 877 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96
& Ct. 433 (1975); Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restric-
tions to Private Activity, 74 CoLUM. L. Rv. 656, 656 n.4 (1974); Comment, Federal
Comity, Official Immunity, and the Dilemma of Section 1983, 1967 DUKE L.J. 741, 742.
But see Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 646 (7th Cir. 1972) (en
banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) (analysis of fourteenth amendment state ac-
tion requirement focuses on factors different from analysis of § 1983 under color of law
requirement).
Most actions brought against hospitals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) name the Hos-
pital Survey and Construction Act (Hill-Burton Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291(o) (1970),Washington University Open Scholarship
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to support a finding of state action.44 Indeed, the number of conten-
as the statute supplying the state action requirement. Hill-Burton is designed to increase
hospital services in the United States by distributing federal funds through state govern-
ments to participating public or nonprofit hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1970). To ob-
tain Hill-Burton funds, a state must prepare a detailed plan and name a state agency
to determine state medical needs and means to fulfill those needs. Hospitals that dis-
criminate on the basis of race, creed, or religion are not eligible. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291
(c)-(d); 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.111-.122 (1975). See generally Comment, Provision of Free
Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8 HLv. Crv. RIGHTS-CIr. LIy. L. Rav. 351
(1973); 62 GEo. L.J. 1783 (1974).
A court considering alleged hospital discrimination might also weigh receipt of Medi-
care and Medicaid payments, licensing or incorporation of the institution by the state,
see A. BERLE, supra note 42, at 47, and the argument that health care of its citizens
is a state function. Cases involving charges of unlawful discrimination by a hospital
or university in which state action was found include Klinge v. Lutheran Charities
Ass'n, 523 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1975) (participation in Hill-Burton program is source of
state action); Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975)
(Hill-Burton funding and other state financial and regulatory involvement constitutes
state action); Shaw v. Hospital Auth., 507 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1975) (actions of govern-
ing body of public hospital with state and federal funds are state actions); Sosa v. Board
of Managers of Val Verde Mem. Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1971) (board of hos-
pital that received Hill-Burton funds acts as state agency); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen.
Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (Hill-Burton funds are source of state ac-
tion); Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 360 F.2d 577 (4th Cir. 1966)
(private hospital's participation in Hill-Burton program established state action); Eaton
v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) (hospital, non-recipient of Hill-Burton funds,
performs state function of health care and is therefore an instrumentality of the state);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 938 (1964) (denial of staff privileges to black doctor by hospital receiving
Hill-Burton funds is state action); Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp.
992 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (tax exemption, scholarship support, government research projects,
government financing combine to render university's action state action); Citta v. Dela-
ware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (Hill-Burton funds awarded hos-
pital are basis for state action). Contra, Greco v. Orange Mem. Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d
873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 433 (1975) (insufficient county-hospital involve-
ment to justify a finding of state action); Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d
556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 422 (1975) (tax exemption, state charter, and
federal funds not sufficient basis for state action); Doe v. Bellin Mem. Hosp., 479 F.2d
756 (7th Cir. 1973) (acceptance of Hill-Burton funds not adequate grounds for state
action); Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ore. 1975) (receipt
of Hill-Burton funds coupled with federal and state tax exemptions and state appoint-
ment of minority of hospital board is not state action); Spencer v. Community Hosp.,
393 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. I1. 1975) (receipt of state funds does not evidence the state
involvement necessary for state action); Slavcoff v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 375 F.
Supp. 999 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (receipt of Hill-Burton funds is not cause for a finding of
state action).
All of the hospitals involved in First National Bank satisfied some or all of the cri-
teria that have been recognized as a basis for state action.
44. The court summarized its argument against state action by reference to Jackson
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tions examined and discarded suggests that the court could have dis-
cerned, in the sum of many separate grounds, substantial support for a
finding of state action.45
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See note 20 supra. Jackson is dis-
tinct from First National Bank on several grounds. In lackson, a privately owned and
operated utility company held a certificate of convenience from the state Public Utilities
Commission. When the company cut off a delinquent customer's service, she filed suit
mocking damages and an injunction to compel the company to provide power. The cus-
tomer alleged that she had a right to electrical service and that Metropolitan's disruption
of service constituted state action, depriving her of property without due process. 419
U.S. at 347-48.
Although the utility had filed a certificate of convenience with the state commission,
the commission had never conducted a hearing on the company's service termination
procedure. The Court found that the filing without more did not amount to state au-
thorization. This holding provides little support for the First National Bank court's po-
sition if, as Shelley mandates, judicial approval is seen as state authorization. The most
critical distinction is that Jackson did not involve racial discrimination. Courts have
developed a more flexible state action standard for cases involving racial discrimination.
In Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1395
(2d Cir. 1974), the court referred to this difference as a "double 'state action' standard."
Id. at 797. This special treatment of racial claims stems from the original goal of the
amendnent, combatting racial discrimination. See note 11 supra and accompanying
text. See also Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1976);
Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556, 560 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 96
&. Ct. 422 (1975); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1127
(2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring).
It should be noted that the Court in Jackson discounted the extensive state regulation
of the utility company, 419 U.S. at 350-51, although, as Justice Marshall pointed out
in dissent, great authority supports the proposition that "the State's sanction did not need
to be in the form of an affirmative command." 419 U.S. at 369 n.2 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The Court had previously indicated that even minimal state involvement
would be construed as state action. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 309-11
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (state inaction can constitute responsible state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (even state inaction can amount to approval of discrimina-
tion); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (conduct in question must be "sanc-
tioned in some way by the State") (emphasis added). Jackson thus reflects a more con-
servative tendency in the current members of the Court. See Barker, Black Americans
and the Burger Court: Implications for the Political System, 1973 WAsH. U.L.Q. 747;
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1972); Mendelson, From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive
Equal Protection, 66 AM. POL. Sci. R v. 1226 (1972); Note, State Action and the
Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840 (1974).
45. Numerous cases endorse the theory that no single factor can be determinative
of the existence of state action; the total relationship between the state and the alleged
transgressor is the relevant consideration. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961), illustrated the procedure:
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The Missouri Supreme Courts refusal to find state action reflects the
uncertainty surrounding the concept. 40 The line between private and
state discrimination is often vague and ill-defined.47 Constitutional
Addition of all these activities, obligations and responsibilities of the Author-
ity, the benefits mutually conferred, together with the obvious fact that the
restaurant is operated as an integral part of a public building . . . indicates
that degree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory action
which it was the design of the Fourteenth Amendment to condemn.
Id. at 724.
See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Jackson v. Statler
Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Wahba
v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Eaton
v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Rackin v. University of Pennsylvania, 386 F.
Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
The First National Bank court made no effort to consider the totality of the relationship
between the state and the trust-its trustee, beneficiaries, and judicial construction.
46. The court's opinion reflected the fear that a contrary result would signal the de-
mise of one's freedom to dispose of property by will. 52-3 S.W.2d at 821. But testators
now lack absolute freedom of testation; the power to devise is circumscribed by many
statutes. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.160 (1969) (surviving spouse has right to take
against will); Mo. RFv. STAT. § 474.320 (1969) (formalities of execution necessary to
create a valid will); Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.400 (1969) (testator must fulfill requirements
to revoke a will). See also Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Re-
form, 52 GEo. LJ. 499, 501 (1964) (testator's "freedom" is subject to claims of cred-
itors, surviving spouse's forced share, statutory provisions for disinherited heirs, statutory
restrictions on charitable dispositions, statutory restrictions on dispositions for immoral
purposes, gift and estate tax); Nussbaum, Liberty of Testation, 23 A.B.A.J. 183 (1937)
(attitude towards unrestricted liberty of testation appears to be declining).
The First National Bank court's fear is reminiscent of Justice Harlan's dissent in
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), which feared the "pervasive potentialities of this
'public function' theory of state action." 382 U.S. at 322 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
foresaw its future misapplication to myriad other functions previously viewed as nongov-
ernmental. The apprehensions of both Justice Harlan and of the First National Bank
court, however, must be balanced against the protection of each person's constitutional
rights. An infrequently noted passage from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
illustrates this balance. Respondents in Shelley contended that if the Court denied the
injunction, they would be denied equal protection of the law. To this argument the
Court said:
The Constitution confers on no individual the right to demand action by the
State which results in the denial of equal protection of the laws to other indi-
viduals. And it would appear beyond question that the power of the State to
create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries
defined by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 22. See also Bassett, The Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement in Race
Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 39, 53 (1972); Note, Section 1981 and Private
Groups: The Right to Discriminate versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J
1441 (1975).
47. The Supreme Court has declared that formulation of a precise test for state ac-
tion is an impossible task. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967); Burton
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rights are at stake; the need for a definitive statement of the boundaries
by the United States Supreme Court is manifest.48
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552, 556 (1947). Although the resulting flexibility has been cited as a virtue, see
Burton, supra at 722, this failure to delineate clear standards may be a vice in close
cases. See note 48 infra.
48. A leading authority on the law of trusts observed:
Some vain and obstinate donors indeed might prefer to have their own way
forever, whether that way should ultimately prove beneficial or not. But why
should effect be given to such an unreasonable desire? . . . [A man] is per-
mitted to devote his property in perpetuity to charitable purposes only because
the public interest is supposed to be promoted by the creation of charities ...
The founder of a charity should understand therefore that he cannot create a
charity which shall be forever exempt from modification.
ScorrT § 399.4.
Scott's position suggests a public policy argument-that testators should be forbidden
to discriminate. Courts understandably would prefer to ground their reasoning on more
concrete bases. But see Turd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). In Hurd, handed down
on the same day as Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Court was confronted
with a racially discriminatory covenant in the District of Columbia. Thus deprived of
the fourteenth amendment prohibition against state judicial enforcement of discrimina-
tion, the Court invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), and
emphasized:
But even in the absence of the statute, there are other considerations which
would indicate that enforcement of restrictive covenants. . . is judicial action
contrary to the public policy of the United States .... The power of the
federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exer-
cised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the
United States as manifested in the Constitution. . . . Where the enforcement
of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of
courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power.
334 U.S. at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
Absent a definitive statement by the Supreme Court, the protean character of state ac-
tion, once regarded as a substantial asset, may be the ultimate source of its fall from
judicial grace. For a sampling of the criticisms directed toward the state action doctrine,
see Gunther, supra note 44 (restrictive interpretation of precedent has curtailed the vital-
ity of state action); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action"
Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLuM. L. R.v. 855 (1966) (conflicting
constitutional claims can neutralize violations of the fourteenth amendment); Williams,
The Twilight of State Action, 41 TExAs L. REv. 347 (1963) (right of public to be free
from discrimination must be weighed against private right to discriminate). In denying
certiorari to First National Bank, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975), the Supreme Court leaves still
undefined the scope of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See notes 15-16 & 38-41
aupra.
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